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ABSTRACT: Following the 2017 UK terrorist attacks by extremist religious 
individuals, it is notable that politicians and individual commentators remarked on 
the pressing need for local partnership working in England (BBC question time, 5 
June 2017; Faith Matters 2017; Brendan Cox 19 June 2017).  For it is by this means, 
people working together in a community, that local information and intelligence 
can be accessed, especially relating to emerging radicalisation. The early warning 
signs that could lead to active terrorism of the kind witnessed in the 2017 attacks 
(UNISON 2016) are being missed, and there are reasons why. 
This paper looks at why local information and multi-agency partnership are 
important to policing and community safety in the context of concerns about 
radicalisation and extremism, reviewing the policy changes, and their effects in 
partnership arrangements that have occurred in the UK since 2010. The paper goes 
on to present findings about the crucial significance of local partnership working in 
detecting radicalisation and some of the challenges faced by professionals now.  The 
third part of the paper considers the question of how relevant agencies can monitor 
ongoing extremism and terrorism in communities through local intelligence gleaned 
through partnership working and other means.
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1. Why partnership matters
The Faith Matters Group, a UK-based multi-faith organisation, wrote an open letter 
to the Prime Minister, Theresa May in 2017 saying 
“The only way forward is through multi-level engagement and dialogue, 
irrespective of political differences. Her Majesty’s Government is also our 
Government and we firmly believe that dialogue and partnership are the best 
ways to counter extremism.”  
This sentiment was echoed in BBC television’s Question Time prior to the 2017 
general election by Nicola Sturgeon, first Minister of Scotland (BBC 2017) and by 
Brendan Cox, the husband of murdered English MP, Jo Cox, on the BBC news on 19 
June 2017. Both the Scottish first minister and Brendan Cox emphasised the need 
for communities to work together and for statutory agencies to involve themselves 
in partnership with them. This, it was suggested, will help to identify early warning 
signs and concerns in communities about individuals and groups that could be at 
risk of extremism or terrorist activity. In light of these concerns, it is important to 
focus attention on some of the key policy changes that have contributed to a decline 
in local partnership working and community cohesion, whilst trying to answer the 
questions raised.
There is evidence in the research for this paper that partnership and joint working 
at local level can be a significant contributor in the move towards tackling religious 
extremism where it appears to germinate in communities. We must ask why, after 
these latest terrorist incidents, do ordinary people appear to be calling for a return 
to local partnership working rather than encouraging us to build on existing 
partnerships? What could have happened to community links with statutory and 
non-statutory bodies that we are now asking ourselves searching questions about 
how religious extremism and terrorism goes undetected by those that could, in 
theory, respond? Critically, why does there now seem to be a gap in this local 
intelligence? This paper offers some possible responses to these questions about 
our connectedness to local people.
Whatever the dearth in partnership working at local level, it behoves us in light of 
these recent terrorist attacks, to question the ongoing role of civic society in helping 
to prevent radicalisation and terrorism.  If we are to respond as a “joined up society” to 
the tragedies created by terrorism, an exploration of the current position with regard 
to local, community-based partnership in England is clearly important and timely. 
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2. The roots of multi-agency partnership working
Multi-agency partnership as a concept is not new.  Most local authorities in England 
have worked closely with various agencies and communities over the years, but in 
the early days of the 1997 Blair government in the UK, multi-agency partnership 
became a key operational mechanism for a more “joined up” form of government 
and localism (Ling 2002, 616; Pollitt 2003). This was intended to encourage closer 
working between central and local governments to further the notion of localism, 
encourage greater interaction between stakeholders at local level to support policy 
and make good use of resources.  
The Children Act, 1989 (Great Britain 1989) established the statutory framework 
for inter-agency collaboration in the UK, setting up the foundations for co-operation 
between different organisations, stakeholders and ordinary people in a given locality 
(Cheminais 2008, 1). Multi agency partnerships (MAPs) became a statutory 
requirement for local government in England with the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 
(Great Britain 1998) which established Crime and Disorder Reduction Partnerships 
(CDRPs, now Community Safety Partnerships or CSPs) in localities across the country. 
Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) followed in 2000 with the Local Government Act 
(Great Britain 2000) which were similarly constituted but with a wider brief across 
communities. The CSPs still have a statutory remit, and therefore retain validity in 
the wider picture of community safety. The LSPs, however, do not.  That does not 
mean to say that the LSPs are in any sense less valid.  Many have changed to become 
community partnerships, delivering good quality community partnership working, 
or have been absorbed into the CSP (Roberts 2016, 1).  
Multi agency partnerships such as the LSPs and CSPs are characterised by their 
breadth and variety of membership.  This was set out in the legislation and statutory 
instruments that initiated them in the first place (Great Britain 1989; Great Britain 
2000; DETR 09, 2001). Members usually include Police, Fire and Rescue Services, 
Local Authorities, Faith Groups, NHS, Voluntary sector, Education, Probation, 
representatives, community leaders, Social and Caring services, those dealing with 
domestic abuse and many others. The idea was, and still is, that all sections of the 
community should be represented, providing a forum for the discussion of relevant 
local issues within a given area, which usually tends to be urban-based, even if those 
members of the partnership also represent more rural areas.  The governance for these 
partnerships, although set out at national level, is intended to reflect the local area.
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The practice of running public services locally within a geographically close area fits 
with the notion of corporatist governance (Pierre 2011, 49). Corporatist Governance 
as described by Pierre (2011) focuses on multi-agency public service delivery within 
an urban geographical area and, significantly, is characterised by a more “distributive” 
(p. 50) form of network governance. This means that governance is shared among 
members as with CSPs and LSPs. Co-operation and joint working are typical of a 
corporatist governance environment, which includes ordinary members of the public 
with an interest in the area.  Most significant of all is the encouragement of “public 
discourse on matters of public concern” (p. 51). Here at the most local of levels, 
important information can be shared, not just between statutory agencies such as 
the police and local authorities, but with all partners, including those members of 
the public who are involved.  This approach is typical of both the CSPs and the LSPs 
and is a recognised form of “partnership paradigm” (Crawford in Delpeuch and Ross 
2016, 3) for community and knowledge-based policing.
Any changes to the process of corporatist governance in a given area will weaken the 
chain of local information, as with the removal of the Police Community Support 
Officers (PCSOs) in some areas (Greig-Midlane 2014; Loveday 2017a; Loveday 
2017b) and the demise of local partnerships such as the LSPs and the distancing 
of the CSPs from the Police and Crime Commisioners (Loveday 2013). The loss of 
the PCSOs is a very troubling issue in the fragmentation of local information from 
communities and appears to represent a bid to preserve the establishment posts of full 
police officers (Greig-Midlane 2014, 7; UNISON 2016). In light of the comments 
made by politicians and other commentators referred to previously, Andy Stenning, 
(2016) stated in the UNISON interview cited above 
“If you look at counter terrorism, PCSOs are the eyes and ears of the counter 
terrorism branch, they are engaging with all communities, and learning about 
what’s going on.  They have what we call ‘local intelligence’ that in crime situations 
leads us to offenders, and in terrorist situations to the terrorists.”
This is supported by the research for this paper. One participant from Surrey Police 
(Interview 1) affirmed that the intelligence from PCSOs gives police officers vital local 
knowledge about where problems are likely to occur, who could be involved and where 
to direct precious, diminishing police resources. In times of extreme stress in public 
sector spending, this information saves both time and resources. The removal of the 
PCSOs (Greig-Midlane 2014, 7) in forces across the country weakens a central link 
in the chain of local knowledge and by extension, the ability for the police and other 
agencies to detect emerging threats such as extremism and terrorism.
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3. Changes in governance and partnership arrangements
Since 2010 and the introduction of the Localism Act 2011, (Great Britain 2011) 
which dismantled the power of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) in England by 
removing the Local Area Agreements (Rees, Mullins and Bovaird 2012, 5) local 
joint working between agencies has become more fragmented.  Added to this, the 
Community Safety Partnerships have seen their role confused and in some cases side-
lined by the introduction of the Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) (Crawford 
in Delpeuch and Ross 2016). Loveday (2013) warned of this, pointing out that the 
PCCs could affect the Community Safety Partnerships (CSPs) negatively. There is no 
statutory imperative to compel the PCCs to work with CSPs and the concern that he 
mentions in this paper emanating from CSPs about the rather flaccid responsibility 
by PCCs to “monitor” the CSPs appears to cast the PCCs in a more remote role. The 
research for this paper supports that perception in that respondents report a sense 
of separation and remoteness from PCCs, and indeed one respondent (Interview 
3) from the offices of a PCC confirmed that the role focuses more on the “national, 
than the local picture”. Loveday’s (2013) paper goes on to discuss the benefits of local 
multi agency partnership, established under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (Great 
Britain1998) in which agencies were required to work together to tackle local issues.
CSPs are still functioning in most areas, and continue to deliver the multi-agency work 
that connects local communities with statutory bodies, but there is concern over the 
future under the aegis of the PCCs and the distancing of the relationship between 
the two of them (Crawford in Delpeuch and Ross 2016). The remoteness in the 
relationship between some PCCs and CSPs represents a dislocation from the local to 
the national picture and begs the question: how can the kind of local intelligence that 
could help detect radicalisation and nascent terrorist activity be effectively shared with 
those in a national policy-influencing position without strong connections and close 
working between the two?  This is taking place within an environment of diminishing 
police resources, (Disney and Simpson 2017). In this financial climate, there are 
anxieties that the police may need to divert already strained resources towards tackling 
terrorism, which may leave other core services vulnerable (interviews 1, 2 and 5).  This 
situation is something of a “Catch22”. Focusing large scale resources on terrorism 
may drain the very local resources that could help detect it. Notwithstanding this 
difficult situation and given that tackling terrorism is a key priority, the connections 
to vital local intelligence, where terrorism can germinate through radicalisation, are 
more important than ever. Terrorism is not openly discussed on a national stage by 
those who are plotting it, but it does appear to begin covertly in local communities.
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It should be remembered that most local partnerships and public services are operating 
in an environment in which rapidly contracting resources dominate the agenda for 
public services. No respite appears to be forthcoming, and further cuts to public 
spending are planned (LGA 2017). Meanwhile the research for this paper has shown 
that the relationships between some CSPs and PCCs continue to be uncertain and a 
cause for concern, especially among community safety practitioners in local councils. 
(Crawford in Delpuech and Ross 2016, 148). This represents a difficult operating 
environment in which local information can be easily shared.
4. Political and policy changes 
The policy changes and revisions to policy since the advent of the UK Coalition 
Government in 2010 and the Conservative Government in 2015 have all led in a 
particular direction. The Coalition, then Conservative government policy of Austerity 
was initiated as a political response to part of a global crisis precipitated by the failure 
of the sub-prime mortgage market in the US and the increase in risky lending activities 
on the part of some banks and financial institutions. The reaction to this by the UK 
Coalition Government in 2010 was to launch a programme of Austerity to tackle 
a national financial deficit exacerbated by this crisis. Austerity was undertaken in 
the British public sector as an approach to reducing the size of the state and cutting 
public spending whilst enlarging the role of the private sector in the delivery of public 
services (Sawyer 2011, 4).    
The brunt of the cuts to public spending under Austerity were borne by local 
government in the first instance ( JRF 2015) and by major services such as the NHS 
and the Police. The drive to reduce public spending was announced resulting in a 
projected end to direct government grant funding to local authorities in England by 
2020. This news produced the now famous Barnet council “graph of doom” showing 
the demands on local authorities to provide adult social care and children’s services 
alone and the amount expected in government grants through to 2020 when central 
government funding through the Revenue Support Grant would drastically reduce. 
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Source: ResearchGate.net
Cuts to public expenditure over the seven years since 2010 have meant that the current 
position is that the UK is heading for the lowest place on a graph of all the world’s 
major capitalist countries in terms of public spending (Gooby-Taylor 2017). 
To what extent this approach is ideological on the part of the Tory-led government in 
Great Britain is a subject for debate, which is not the focus of this paper.  However, 
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it is worth noting in this context that the demise of the type of local connections and 
locally interactive fabric of society that Robert Putnam famously called “social capital” 
in his 2000 book “Bowling Alone” is now the subject of academic debate.  Further, it 
became a political item when in 2009 David Cameron, Prime Minister at the time, 
tried to introduce the Big Society to Britain. Essentially, the Big Society idea was that 
civil society should do more to help itself by using the kind of “social capital” that is 
the currency of the voluntary sector. Ordinary people and the established Voluntary 
Sector would take up the delivery of public services where the public sector could no 
longer provide them, or indeed take over public amenities. It is fair to say that this 
notion, predicated on the idea that many would volunteer, fell by the wayside and 
became something of a political embarrassment to the Conservative Party (Woodhouse 
2015). Ferragina and Arrigoni (2016) comment that in an age of economic crisis 
such as that precipitated by the 2008 financial crash, “the policy aim to bolster social 
capital is incompatible with a neo-liberalist political agenda” (p. 355). Neoliberalism 
as a political credo sits firmly within the Conservative canon for reducing the welfare 
state and promoting the predominance of the private sector over the public.  It is a 
curious expectation to ask civil society to demonstrate the altruism typical of the 
social capital that would support the free exchange of information about community 
safety in a Conservative-dominated political arena.
In spite of this, partnership, local information and community intelligence are part 
of the same picture for community policing and for the Fire and Rescue Service with 
whom the police now work in close collaboration since the advent of the Policing and 
Crime Act 2017 (Great Britain 2017). This Act brings the emergency services closer 
together; Police, Fire and Rescue and Ambulance services. It is worth remembering 
that the Fire and Rescue Services work with and for the community, enjoying long-
standing relationships with the localities in which they are sited. As with the Police, 
links to local areas are strong, and between the two services, a wealth of local knowledge 
resides.  Both services are regular participators in community partnerships such as 
the LSPs and the CSPs. It therefore remains the case that people working together in 
multi-agency partnerships, gleaning information from representatives in the local area 
can help to identify any concerns, even at neighbourhood level, at an early stage. Any 
losses in terms of the links to this intelligence are worrying, not just to those involved 
in front line service delivery, but to a national audience. Crawford (in Delpeuch and 
Ross, 129) suggests in his 2016 analysis that the current Conservative government’s 
narrowing of the police remit to address crime fighting may have resulted in a more 
generalised lack of police engagement with partnerships and non-statutory participants 
in community safety.  This further distancing of local participation in the partnership 
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paradigm may be contributing to the further fragmentation of local intelligence. 
Coupled with reductions in funding for the Police, this represents an even deeper 
diminution of resources to support local partnership working.
In a climate, then, of reducing resources and commitment to inter-agency partnership 
working, plus the blurring of links between PCCs and CSPs, it is small wonder 
that it has begun to come to the attention of national politicians and those with 
an interest in the cohesion of civic society that we are losing the links to the local 
information that could help in detecting and preventing radicalisation and the 
terrorism that can result from it.  
5. Research origins
The research for this paper began under the auspices of a research project about 
multi-agency partnership working in 2016. What emerged from the 2016 research 
was a concentration on community safety which had not been accounted for in 
the original research design. The project focused on three partnerships in Sussex 
and Surrey and sought to produce interim results for a wider research project into 
partnerships in England.  However, it became clear that some of the unexpected 
material that came to light merited attention, and this focused on community safety 
issues relating to the role of partnerships in gathering and sharing local intelligence. 
In addition to the original twelve senior public officials that participated in the 2016 
project, a further six community safety and policing personnel have been added to 
the research in 2017 and 2018.  
6. Research design
Taking into account the notion of Corporatist Governance and propinquity referred 
to above, (Pierre 2011, 49) and the fact that the type of partnerships in the research 
are based in specific geographical areas in local communities, it must be noted that 
Corporatist Governance tends to focus on urban environments and governance 
in cities.  Some CSPs cover wide rural areas in addition to urban conurbations, so 
although some aspects of Corporatist Governance are relevant, such as the role of 
the businesses community in multi-agency partnerships, there are shortcomings in 
the notion for the purpose of this research.  Notwithstanding these shortcomings, 
John (2008, p. 21 in Pierre 2011, 2) points out that the frequency and environmental 
closeness of contact (propinquity) among partnership members and the duration of 
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these relationships are significant factors in efficient governance for these multi-agency 
partnerships. This feature is reflected in the comments of participants 1-18, who 
concur that some of the most important elements of a partnership are the duration 
of the relationships, the trust between members and the speed of transactions 
(information sharing) within the partnership as a result of these relationships.  The 
final question in each of the 18 interviews was “Can you describe the best thing about 
the partnership, and the worst thing?”. Without exception, participants said that the 
best thing is the “networking”, “relationships between members” and “information 
sharing”. Worst features of the partnership are the processes and procedures, time 
between meetings and that officer presentations were “too long”(Interviews 6, 7, 8 
and 10), eating into networking time. 
With regard to theory: the relevance and relationship of Grounded Theory to this 
research is clear in that the subject matter necessarily demands that focusing on those 
practitioners who are actually engaged in multi-agency partnership working would be 
best placed to provide information about local intelligence in the areas in which they 
operate. Practitioners and senior public officials were selected for interview because 
of their roles in local multi agency partnerships as either leaders or representatives 
of organisations. All research participants are currently involved community multi 
agency partnerships, Community Safety Partnerships or Community Safety matters 
on a regular, ongoing basis and offer comments from strategic, practitioner and 
personal viewpoints. They are either local government senior executives, Chief 
Executives of local authorities and charitable organisations, Police officers and 
Inspectors.  Grounded Theory literally “grounds” the research in practice, and this 
is the purpose of the research: to investigate the role of multi-agency practitioner 
partnerships in detecting radicalisation.
The research is based on semi-structured interviews and Non Participant Observation 
carried out during 2016 to 2018. These methods were selected in order to provide 
qualitative information about the partnerships surveyed.  A qualitative approach to the 
research was chosen for its richness and depth, given that the focus for the research is 
individual actors with a significant role in community safety and a multi-faceted story 
to tell about their involvement in partnerships and the societal issues that they face. 
Involvement with communities tends to be deep, taking place on many interactive 
levels. It is these individuals who puzzle out the complexities of local communities 
and where to focus attention on issues of concern across the many disciplines and 
agencies involved in protecting life and safeguarding.
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7. Findings
The hypothesis for this research is that local multi agency partnerships such as 
the CSPs have a significant role to play in detecting radicalisation and helping to 
prevent the development of terrorist activity through sharing information. Questions 
investigating the sharing of information were further explored in the interviews 
undertaken in 2017-18 in order to establish connections with CSPs and the 
partnership processes for information exchange.
Interviews undertaken for the original 2016 study also included two questions 
about participants’ views concerning what makes the partnership successful, having 
first asked each participant how they defined partnership success in terms of their 
professional role.  It was these and the final question that elicited information about 
community safety and the value of the partnership in the early detection of criminal 
activity and the development of radicalisation in communities. For some, partnership 
success equated to the number of community “problems” tackled in terms of criminal 
activity.  But what makes the partnerships successful for all but one participant is 
the ability to share information quickly about problems in the area: to succeed in 
“troubleshooting” (Interview 9), local problems. 8 responses specifically included the 
radicalisation of individuals and possible terrorist activity. Six further partnership 
representatives were then included in the research cohort to take further account of 
the CSP and policing role in communities and again, what each of the additional 
participants, without exception, valued most about the partnership was the ability 
to share information quickly about local individuals and groups, thereby helping to 
address any problems in the locality.  
Furthermore, a key finding from the later research is that it is the formation of long 
term professional relationships with other practitioners that enables the swifter 
resolution of local problems for community safety, endorsing the findings from the 
2016 results. For example, a Police participant (Interview 17) said “If I have a concern 
about a family or person in the community that I believe is involved in radicalisation 
or other related activity, I can walk across the room where other professionals have 
come to the partnership and talk to social services, housing, or health professionals 
about the family to see if they have had any contact with them and what their view is. 
It’s that easy sharing of information that helps me detect pockets of suspect activity so 
that I can deal with it locally.” Among other partnership professionals who participated 
in this research, 17 affirmed the importance of propinquity and specifically, trusting 
professional relationships. The findings show that where professionals have evolved 
relationships of trust in these partnerships, it is the willingness to be open and honest 
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in the sharing of information that facilitates co-ordinated action to be taken swiftly 
to address issues of concern. This is also reflected and supported in O’Neill and 
McCarthy’s 2012 paper (O’Neill and McCarthy 2012). Moreover, what distinguishes 
the findings in this research is the focus on detecting radicalisation and the importance 
of co-ordinated, joint action to tackle it in communities.
“Soft skills, hard results” was a comment made by the police officer in Interview 1. 
By this, the officer meant that investing in the relationships between partners and 
stakeholders in the community, such as faith groups, charities and community leaders, 
he was able to achieve multi-layered sets of information about individuals, families 
and groups.  This was later repeated in interviews 17 and 18 when participants were 
asked about how they built connections with communities.  These participants 
confirmed that their information about those at risk is gained from dialogue with 
key individuals who are active within those communities.  Whilst this is similar to 
the “social capital” that Putnam (2000, 19) refers to, and may indeed be a dimension 
of it (Putnam 2000, 20) the co-ordinated action it enables distinguish it further 
from interaction solely for social benefit.  The intelligence from local people and 
multi-agency partners provides key agencies with the means to address problems 
strategically, planning approaches and responses to achieve the best possible outcome 
in terms of community safety (Interview 5).
8. Monitoring and tackling extremism and radicalisation in future
There are some serious questions to address in tackling extremism and radicalisation in 
communities, and this paper does not propose replacing any current arrangements in 
the governance of local areas.  Rather it seems clear from the findings in this research 
project, that instead of side-lining or dismantling local multi agency with an interest 
in community safety partnerships (Crawford in Delpeuch and Ross 2016), we must 
strengthen them and use them more efficiently. The role that they play in connecting 
the local with the national picture of emerging radicalisation and terrorism is one of 
value in that terrorism, as stated above, is not incubated on a national stage but begins 
in local communities in neighbourhoods that are known to individuals active in local 
partnerships, making them more easily accessible through participating local agencies. 
There are, of course, those individuals that are wholly unknown to the authorities, and 
no partnership or individual can be omnipresent in detecting covert activity.  However, 
this research shows there is a powerful role for multi-agency partnership in detecting 
radicalisation and helping to prevent activity that could result in terrorism. Many 
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gangs and groups are already known to security services in local areas in the UK, 
which is a further finding in this research, although not unique. Removing or reducing 
that stratum of professionals who interact with such groups and pass information to 
statutory and voluntary agencies who could help tackle the problems associated with 
them is counter-productive and in some cases could mean that we are less effective in 
detecting and preventing terrorism, both as a society and as statutory agencies.  The 
loss of these connections to local partnerships and the resourcing reductions that 
this paper explores have, and will if continued, compromise our joint ability to detect 
radicalisation in communities.
Because multi agency partnerships are comprised of individuals from a wide range 
of organisations and groups, it is this resource that provides the conduit for local 
information to be swiftly and easily passed among agencies. The route for such 
information is via trusted professional relationships of long standing, and these often 
exist in local multi-agency partnerships. If such partnerships are compromised or 
removed, and similarly, if such valuable local resources as PCSOs (Loveday 2017b) 
are reduced and CSPs side-lined, we diminish our capacity to protect people and 
society.  The, perhaps, unintended consequences of swingeing cuts to local government 
(Comptroller and Auditor General 2014; Innes and Tetlow 2015; Local Government 
Association 2015), who participate, manage or lead such partnerships, and cuts to 
other public sector services in England are that we have less effective, less joined-up 
networks. This outcome is corroborated in the research for this paper. The more 
concerning elements of these results are that it is joined up local networks of multi-
agency groups and partnerships that could help to tackle the emergence of terrorist 
activity in local areas.  Without them we are all more vulnerable.
Interviews:
Interview 1: Surrey Police.  
Interview 2:  Surrey Police commander.
Interview 3:  Officer from the Police and Crime Commissioners Office, Hampshire.
Interview 4:  Officer from the Police and Crime Commissioners Office, Sussex.
Interview 5:  Former Police and Crime Commissioner.
Interview 6:  Leader of a local council in Surrey.
Interview 7:  Senior officer, Horsham District Council.
Interview 8: Chief Executive Officer of a District Council in Sussex.
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Interview 9: Retired police officer and councillor in Adur, West Sussex.
Interview 10:  Chief Executive Officer for a Surrey Charity.
Interview 11:  Elected Member of a Surrey local council.
Interview 12:  Former lead officer for Local Strategic Partnership in Worthing West Sussex
Interview 13:  Former Probation Officer. Sussex.
Interview14:  Serving Prison officer.  London.
Interview 15: Lead officer for Community Safety Partnership, Hampshire.
Interview 16:  Lead officer for Community Safety Partnership, Portsmouth.
Interview 17: Police officer, Hampshire Constabulary.
Interview 18: Community Co-ordinator, Hampshire.
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